Agudat Yisrael in Palestine and the Holocaust - 1942-1945 Abstract of The Doctoral Thesis Dr. Chaim Shalem Research into the manner in which the yishuv - the Jewish population of pre-State Palestine - related to the Holocaust has generally ignored the position of Agudat Yisrael and the role it played at the time, and even studies on Agudat Yisrael itself have not devoted serious attention to the activities of the movement during the Holocaust years. Additionally, the historical literature produced within haredi circles in general and within Agudat Yisrael in particular, does not present an orderly picture of the situation. In light of the above, the goal of this study is to present a balanced and complete picture, as far as possible, of Agudat Yisrael's activities in Palestine related to the Holocaust in the years 1942-1945. Thus, the dissertation will contribute to the scholarship on the yishuv's responses to the Holocaust, on the one hand, and to shed light on the history of Agudat Yisrael during this period on the other. The archives of the World Executive Committee of Agudat Yisrael and the Agudat Yisrael Central Committee are not yet open to the public Having been granted access to those archives, I had at my disposal unique primary source material that enabled me to examine the positions and activities of the movement, and also put me in a position to re-evaluate the image of the movement in historical literature, an image perforce based on secondary sources alone. I also had at my disposal material found in the private collections of the families of Agudat Yisrael's major rescue activists during the Holocaust in Palestine and abroad, revealed here for the first time: the collections of Benjamin Mintz, Haim Israel Eiss, Shaul Weingurt (Eiss's partner and assistant). In the archives of the Jewish Haredi Movement in Europe (located in the offices of Agudat Yisrael in New York) I found a great deal of material on Agudat Yisrael in Palestine, although the activities of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine are not the focus of the archives. In addition, this study made use of diverse material about Agudat Yisrael during the Holocaust obtained in the following archives: Yad Vashem, the Central Zionist Archive, the Mizrachi World Center, the Joint Distribution Committee in Jerusalem and New York, the Finkler Holocaust Study Institute Library in Bar Ilan University (which includes an important part of Weingurt's collection) and archive of the Rabbinical Vaad ha-Hatzalah in Yeshiva University in New York. Finally, I had the opportunity to interview a number of people connected to the activities of Agudat Yisrael and other areas related to this study. Following a methodological introduction and a chapter on the background of Agudat Yisrael, this paper is made up of three parts: Part 1 how information about the Holocaust reached Aguda circles in Palestine, how this news was assimilated and the responses to it. Part 2 discusses aid and rescue efforts and Part 3 discusses how the confrontation with the Holocaust affected the politics of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine. The methodological introduction surveys the existing scholarly literature regarding the activities of Agudat Yisrael during the Holocaust. The introduction also presents the haredi historiography about the Holocaust and the place occupied by Agudat Yisrael in it. The introduction also surveys the sources I had at my disposal. Chapter 1, Agudat Yisrael: Establishment, structure and ideology, is the introductory historical chapter dealing with the history of Agudat Yisrael from its establishment up until 1944. It focuses on the foundation of the movement and its relations with the Zionist and Mizrachi movements, and presents an overview of the establishment of the movement in Eretz Israel and its history. The chapter also reviews the movement's institutions and the internal power struggles and concludes that the arrival of Rabbi Isaac Meir Levin to Eretz Israel and the transfer of Agudat Yisrael's Executive Committee to Jerusalem in 1940, with Rabbi Levin at its head, changed the face of the movement's leadership in Eretz Israel, but did not put an end to the power struggles within it. The chapter also demonstrates that in the early years of the war, Agudat Yisrael did not change its attitude to the Jewish national institutions in Palestine and the Zionist endeavor. The second chapter of Part 1, Agudat Yisrael in Eretz Israel and the Jewish fate in Europe in 1939-1942, discusses Agudat Yisrael in Palestine in the early war years (1939-1942) and focuses on how the movement and its members responded to the fate of the Jews during the war and the war news that arrived in Palestine. These responses included publications, activities to alleviate the distress of Poland's Jews and save rabbis and yeshiva students. The chapter concludes that the awakening within Agudat Yisrael came only in the third year of the war when some of its members became aware of the reality taking shape in Europe. Chapter 3, The reactions of Agudat Yisrael in Eretz Israel to the news from Europe in 1942-1945, discusses how Agudat Yisrael related to the Holocaust as it was perceived in late 1942 and the various reactions to the official news on the fate of the Jews in Poland and the rest of Europe. This chapter focuses on the understanding of the news and its assimilation by the leadership and active membership of Agudat Yisrael. The responses of Agudat Yisrael can be divided into a number of areas: various public expressions of self-accusation and blame of others; responses involving total identification with the fate of the Jews in Europe, the organization of prayer vigils and religious gatherings and theological responses. Also discussed in the chapter are the historical significance of the Holocaust as perceived at that time and the extent to which the Holocaust played a central role in the movement's agenda during the Holocaust years. The chapter shows that Agudat Yisrael quickly recovered from its shock at the official news of the destruction of European Jewry and was the first in the yishuv to organize mourning gatherings and make efforts to unify forces within the Jewish population to begin rescue and assistance efforts. Chapter 4, The attitude of Agudat Yisrael in Eretz Israel to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, focuses on the singular event represented by the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, which over time became a symbol - and bone of contention regarding the nature of its commemoration. This chapter begins with a description of the change in attitude that occurred among the Agudat Yisrael rabbis that remained in the ghetto to participation in the uprising. On this background, Chapter 4 discusses the attitude of (official) Agudat Yisrael in Palestine to the uprising, and that of Mintz and Rabbi Moshe Blau (the chairman of the Agudat Yisrael Central Committee in Eretz Israel). The former fought for an honorable place for the members of Agudat Yisrael in the history of the uprising, while the latter made every effort to minimize the value of the uprising and the heroism of those that fought in it. Agudat Yisrael as a movement did not make its views on the uprising and its fighters public, notwithstanding its knowledge that there were members of Agudat Yisrael among the fighters. Chapter 5, The activities of Agudat Yisrael regarding the help and rescue committees, which introduces Part 2 of this paper, moves the perspective from theory to practice. Chapter 4 dealt with the independent activities of Agudat Yisrael to establish a rescue committee of its own to aid and help the Jews of Poland. However, this chapter deals principally with Agudat Yisrael's part in the establishment of a national rescue committee by the Jewish population in pre-State Palestine and its activities in it until the end of the war. The cooperation within the rescue committee represented a major element in the future participation of Agudat Yisrael after the war in the national institutions of the Jewish population and the Zionist movement. Chapter 6, Rescue activities by the representatives of Agudat Yisrael in Switzerland and Turkey, focuses on the rescue efforts carried out by Agudat Yisrael members, Eiss and Griffel. The chapter discusses the working relations they had with Mintz and Rabbi Levin, the manner in which they acted or were activated and their involvement in the rescue work together with representatives of the Zionist movement and its rescue activists in Switzerland and Turkey. The chapter focuses on the special activities of Eiss and others to attain passports and send them to their destinations in ghettos and camps, and follows their desperate attempts to save Jews. The chapter also discusses the unique activities of Griffel and those who assisted him, both as a representative of Agudat Yisrael on the Yishuv's national rescue committee and as the representative of the rabbinical Vaad ha-Hatzalah rescue committee in America. The conclusion of this chapter is that Eiss and Griffel were original and tireless rescue workers who viewed themselves as emissaries of the Jewish people, although they spent considerable effort (as was only natural) rescuing Agudat Yisrael's rabbis, leaders and associates. The cooperation between them and the representatives of Agudat Yisrael on the rescue committee was consistent and productive. Chapter 7, The Teheran Children affair and how it affected Agudat Yisrael's relations with the rescue committee discusses the manner in which all the various parts of Agudat Yisrael related to the "Teheran Children" affair. The principal dispute surrounding the affair occurred in 1943 and centered on the children's education and manner in which the children were to be distributed among schools in Palestine. Agudat Yisrael felt that it was the target of discrimination after its schools were given only 4 percent of the children. This chapter discusses the implications of the affair for the cooperation between Agudat Yisrael and the Jewish Agency, as well as between Agudat Yisrael and the Mizrachi movement in the wake of the affair. Although education was the lifeblood of Agudat Yisrael, and although it was discriminated against in the distribution of children to the various schools and institutions, it did not sever its relations with or discontinue its cooperation with the national rescue committee. Nonetheless, the affair contributed to Agudat Yisrael's mistrust of Mizrachi and the Jewish Agency. Chapter 8, Agudat Yisrael's difficulties in Eretz Israel: Its position regarding Agudat Yisrael's centers in the United States and Britain (1942-1945), discusses the working relations between the world executive of Agudat Yisrael and its main branches during this period - in the United States and Britain. Through an examination of a number of key events (e.g. the information about the murder of the Jews of Europe, the Teheran Children, the Vaad ha-Hatzalah rescue committee of Orthodox rabbis in the United States and the question of Agudat Yisrael's representation on the Polish National Council-in-exile in London), the chapter underscores the difference in the level of cooperation that existed between the American and British branches and the supreme authority of the movement (the executive committee) and its chairman (Rabbi Levin) in Jerusalem and their acceptance of its authority. The conclusion is that the American branch of Agudat Yisrael, headed by Rabbi Eliezer Silver, did not accept the authority of the executive committee and exhibited signs of a struggle over the leadership of the world movement. The British chapter, headed by Harry Goodman, was generally loyal to the executive committee, but did not completely accept its supremacy. The first part of Chapter 9, Agudat Yisrael in Eretz Israel and the influence of the Holocaust on its positions regarding the problem of Eretz Israel, the only chapter in Part 3, gives an overview of the policy of World Agudat Yisrael and its counterpart in Palestine on the political question of Eretz Israel in the pre- and early Holocaust years (1939-1942). The second part of the chapter discusses the change that occurred among most of Agudat Yisrael's leadership in Palestine regarding the political question of Israel in 1944-1945, a change it adhered to despite the opposition of the movement's president, Yaakov Rosenheim, (in New York) and its political secretary Goodman (in London). The chapter culminates with a discussion of Agudat Yisrael's "political declaration" regarding the subject and the centrality of Eretz Israel in the doctrine of the movement and its alignment with the rest of the Jewish population in pre-State Palestine on the political issue. The Holocaust appears to have influenced a conceptual turnabout among Agudat Yisrael's leadership and helped it determine a political position vis-?-vis Eretz Israel and its centrality in Agudat Yisrael's doctrine. This position aided the yishuv's struggle and contributed to Agudat Yisrael's acceptance of the reality of the Jewish settlement in Palestine and its leadership. The conclusion of the paper may summed up as follows: Agudat Yisrael was not a unified movement when it started out. It was populated by opposing currents: Lithuanians and Hassidim; "Ost-Juden" and German Jews; outspoken opponents to modern ideas of any kind and those that tried to create a synthesis between modernity and Orthodoxy; those that opposed Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel and those that invested Jewish immigration to Eretz Israel with theological significance. An outstanding characteristic of the movement was the fact that it did not manage to create strong, authoritarian organizational frameworks such as those established in other Jewish parties. In the mid-1930s, the Agudat Yisrael movement in Palestine was made up of various and considerably different currents that conducted numerous and interminable disputes among themselves. The World Agudat Yisrael Agency, which was established in Palestine in 1935 by the Executive Committee, tried to reconcile the various parts of the movement and their often polarized views. However, despite the unifying umbrella framework, the fundamental differences persisted between the veteran members, representatives of the old-time community in Eretz Israel, on the one hand, and the newcomers that had come to Palestine mainly from Poland and Germany in the 1920s and 1930s on the other. The complex relations within Agudat Yisrael in Palestine played a limited role until the late 1930s. This situation changed following the outbreak of World War II. The movement's centers of activity in Europe, but especially in Poland, Lithuania and Germany, ceased to function and the movement's leaders were now in need of assistance. Moreover, Agudat Yisrael now had three centers of activity: Palestine, Britain and the United States. Although a number of leaders arrived in Palestine and the movement's Executive Committee was transferred there, this was not enough to turn it into a truly predominant new center, whose authority would be accepted by the other two centers. The Executive Committee, most of whose members remained within the territories occupied by the Nazis, discontinued its work, which included the supervision of the movement's activities in Palestine, and renewed it only in the summer of 1940 in Palestine. The deep organizational and ideological rift between the various parts of the movement in Palestine persisted. The rifts, lack of authoritative leadership and lack of communication with the world leadership of the movement led to almost total paralysis and a lack of action and response to the events in Europe on the eve of the war and during its first year. When Rabbi Levin arrived in Palestine in April 1940, the activities of the Executive Committee were also transferred to Palestine. The change affected the structure of the movement in Palestine and the composition of its leadership. The movement's financial difficulties were so great that for varying periods, it did not have enough money even to conduct its regular activities. Nonetheless, the change in the movement's structure and leadership did have an effect on the way it responded to the events in Europe and the scope and nature of Agudat Yisrael's rescue activities. In this context, it was found that the activities did not arise from the ranks of the veteran members of the movement in Palestine, but rather from among the leaders that immigrated to Palestine from Poland either just before or during the war, particularly Benjamin Mintz and Rabbi Levin, who together with other individuals directed the movement's response and rescue activities, especially after 1942. The struggle to save Jews should have become a means to unify the ranks of Agudat Yisrael as a movement. The subject was of supreme importance in of itself, and it was only as a unified movement that Agudat Yisrael had any chance of using its influence. However, when the time for action came, Agudat Yisrael found itself unable to rise above its differences to unify and function as a coordinated movement to contend with the challenges of the period. The reactions and rescue activities carried out in Agudat Yisrael's name were in fact carried out by devoted individuals that acted in Agudat Yisrael's name and who filled important functions in it, e.g. the organization of mourning and prayer gatherings as the news of the fate of European Jews became known. However, these moments underscore the fact that Agudat Yisrael in Palestine suffered from a structural weakness that was highlighted even more during the Holocaust. This weakness had its roots in the 1920s and 1930s. The Executive Committee, which the world movement placed in charge of the rescue activities of European Jews invested a great deal of time in numerous debates, among other things, and attempts to resolve personal and ideological disputes among the various elements of the movement. These attempts were intended to build up a unified movement in Palestine acting under the inspiration of eminent Torah scholars. Even at such a fateful and difficult time for the Jewish people, Agudat Yisrael was unable to attain unity. The Holocaust, then, shed a particularly strong light on the weakness of Agudat Yisrael as a movement. In the early years of the war (1939-1942), there was considerable similarity between Agudat Yisrael and the other parts of the Jewish population of pre-State Palestine, their institutions and parties regarding the process of understanding and assimilating the news of the fate of Europe's Jews. After the news came from Europe about the mass murder of Jews, the yishuv responded with great emotion, but reverted to its previous routine a short time later. Agudat Yisrael preceded the others a little bit regarding its unease regarding the news from Europe, and protested even before the Jewish Agency circulated the official news of the mass murder of Polish Jews and immediately afterwards. But regarding its return to routine life a short time later, it behaved no differently from the others, even if its activities were different. Mintz and Rabbi Levin had to work very hard to rally Agudat Yisrael's leadership, activists and ordinary members around the struggle to aid and save the Jews of Europe. Their efforts initially produced results - the general Agudat Yisrael public participated in prayer, mourning and protest gatherings organized by Agudat Yisrael leaders when the official news of the mass murder of Poland's Jews arrived - but later things changed. In late 1942 and early 1943, Agudat Yisrael's major activists in Palestine invested their energies in the establishment of a national rescue committee. The mourning, prayer and protest gatherings organized by Agudat Yisrael, the headlines in the newspapers, articles and speeches by its leaders consistently called upon public opinion in Palestine, national leaders and the Jewish Agency to establish such a committee. These activities influenced the establishment of a national rescue committee. It consequently turns out that it was Agudat Yisrael, one of the smallest movements in Palestine, and which was not a member of the national and Zionist institutions that was the prime mover behind the initiative to establish the rescue committee. The declaration by Rabbi Levin (in a letter to Ben-Gurion) in December 1942, regarding the tragedy of the Jewish people at that time: "There has been no greater Jewish tragedy since the Jewish people became a nation" expresses a unique outlook, especially in view of the banal definition given by Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency Executive Committee that this tragedy was no more than "yet another catastrophe" in the long litany of the Jewish people's woes. This intense work was carried out by part of Agudat Yisrael's leadership and members, especially at the beginning of the period that is at the focus of this study, when Agudat Yisrael held a prominent and leading position in Jewish Palestine. However, from the spring of 1943 until the winter of 1944, the subject of the Holocaust did not top Agudat Yisrael's public agenda. The movement's executive committee returned to its previous agenda, at the center of which were the movement's routine issues, and most of its leaders were swept up by the same despair as many others in Palestine. Accordingly, the issues related to rescue were relegated to a secondary position on the public agenda of most of the movement's leaders for a long time. The fate of Hungary's Jews and the rescue of those that survived roused Agudat Yisrael, just as it did the entire Jewish population of pre-State Palestine. The attention of Agudat Yisrael and its rescue activists was focused mainly on the Jews of Eastern Europe, especially Poland. Despite the fact that members of Agudat Yisrael were among those targeted by the Nazis in Western and Central Europe too, their fate was never the subject of serious debate. Thus, for example, Rabbi Levin asked Itzhak Gruenbaum in August 1942 to establish a "uniform and central committee for the rescue of our brethren in Poland," and in October 1942, Agudat Yisrael established the rescue committee for "the matter of Poland's Jews under World Agudat Yisrael," which included only Polish Jews, and never established similar committees for the Jews of Germany, France, Holland or Belgium. This tendency was stronger in Agudat Yisrael than in the rest of the yishuv. Another important aspect of the activities of Mintz and Rabbi Levin was the cooperation with Agudat Yisrael representatives abroad. Yisrael Haim Eiss in Switzerland and Jacob Griffel in Turkey were among the most important rescue operatives during the Holocaust. Rabbi Levin and Mintz's greatest success regarding these operatives was not only that they chose the right people, but also succeeded in activating them properly, which they managed to do despite the operatives' individualistic natures. Agudat Yisrael's rescue operatives made special efforts to save rabbis and Torah scholars that were members of or associated with Agudat Yisrael. In this respect, the leadership of Agudat Yisrael behaved no differently from the other movements in the yishuv, which although they decided to help all Jews, in fact and only naturally, placed the emphasis on the activities that would benefit those who were most closely associated with them. Rabbi Levin maintained contact with the branches of Agudat Yisrael in New York and London. But, while the ties with the London branch were productive, and Rabbi Levin drew encouragement from them, the ties with the movement in the United States caused Rabbi Levin considerable distress. Agudat Yisrael in the United States behaved in the areas of help and rescue in accordance with its own understanding of the issue and did not accept the authority of the Executive Committee and Rabbi Levin in Jerusalem, and continued to conduct a persistent debate with them over the centrality of Eretz Israel. This lack of unity in World Agudat Yisrael had repercussions for the status of Agudat Yisrael in Palestine and the ability of its Executive Committee to act. On the background of this lack of unity among the factions that made up Agudat Yisrael in Palestine and its Executive Committee's lack of authority in the world movement, the rescue activities of Rabbi Levin and Mintz are especially unique. Thanks to their unwavering resolve, the extent of their achievements were the equivalent of those of a large movement. Their activities left Agudat Yisrael on the political map of the yishuv, making it a factor that had to be taken into account. An echo of their energetic activities could be heard a year and a half after the war when Yehoshua Suprasky, the deputy chairman of the national rescue committee, a member of the General Zionists and the Vaad Leumi [National Council], submitted a report to the Zionist Congress (November 1946), which included warm words of appreciation for Agudat Yisrael's efforts: "Agudat Yisrael continually works in courageous cooperation, and the leaders of Agudat Yisrael and Poalei Agudat Yisrael, Rabbi Levin and Mintz, always took virtually the first place in the rescue activities, working in full and faithful cooperation." Agudat Yisrael's decision to be part of the rescue committee represented a de facto historical recognition by Agudat Yisrael of the Jewish Agency as the representative of the Jewish people and as an address for the rescue of Europe's Jews. The activities on the rescue committee enabled the members of Agudat Yisrael to draw closer to the Zionist movement and the Jewish Agency, to work together with their institutions even without actually joining their ranks. This rapprochement, along with continued (and unsuccessful) negotiations over Agudat Yisrael joining the Jewish Agency, reached its height a few years later when Agudat Yisrael joined the State of Israel's first government, formed by Ben-Gurion, with Rabbi Levin appointed to serve in it as minister of welfare. However, the change in Agudat Yisrael did not occur only because of its joint activities with the Jewish Agency. There was also a significant change in Agudat Yisrael's perceptions and its decision regarding the centrality of Eretz Israel. This change began to take shape among the leaders of the movement as early as 1943, but took on a clear public expression in the movement only towards the end of the war, from the final months of 1944 on. The need to adapt themselves to the now different Jewish reality after the destruction of Europe's Jews caused the leaders and members of Agudat Yisrael to realize that the debate over Eretz Israel was no longer academic, halachic or ideological, but had now become a practical issue. The events of the Holocaust triggered the change in Agudat Yisrael and helped the movement and its leaders undergo a conceptual revolution regarding the political future of Eretz Israel and overcome the reservations felt by Agudat Yisrael's leaders abroad and Torah scholars in Israel about determining a political position. This conceptual change required Agudat Yisrael to collaborate with the yishuv and its institutions, at least on political issues. This was a very progressive expression of Agudat Yisrael's acceptance of the reality in Eretz Israel and the leadership of the organized yishuv. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this change and Agudat Yisrael's acceptance of the yishuv and its institutions weakened but did not dim the efforts by Agudat Yisrael to separate itself from the yishuv's Zionist ethos. Even if Agudat Yisrael's rescue efforts were ultimately limited, its activities during the Holocaust and its responses to it should be viewed as major factors that were instrumental in changing Agudat Yisrael's overall orientation from the initial path that characterized it in the late 1930s to new horizons that despite all the tensions involved, ultimately integrated and became part of the Israeli national path.